The 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Heads of Government Summit, which was held in Islamabad on October 15-16, marked a critical moment for Pakistan as a player in South Asian and Eurasian geopolitics. As Pakistan played host, the summit offered a platform not only for regional multilateralism but also for the recalibration of diplomatic strategies amid rising internal and external pressures.
For Pakistan, the strategic importance and timing of this event cannot be overstated, as the SCO Summit is a platform to showcase its commitment to multilateralism and its ability to act as a regional interlocutor amidst shifting global alliances. China’s deep involvement in Pakistan’s infrastructure development, coupled with growing U.S. competition and alliances in the region, places Islamabad at a crossroads in its foreign policy orientation. The presence of both Indian and Chinese officials at the summit raised the stakes, particularly as India has remained critical of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects for passing through Gilgit-Baltistan, which it considers part of its territory.
Despite these tensions, the platform allowed Islamabad to assert its leadership role in promoting economic integration while sidestepping contentious bilateral issues. India and Pakistan had explicitly refused bilateral talks this year at the SCO, but the arrival of Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar to attend the summit marked an important moment for bilateral relations of both countries.
The last time an Indian foreign minister visited Pakistan was in 2015, when the relationship between the two nations was markedly different. The visit by then-Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj, accompanied by Jaishankar as foreign secretary, had briefly reinvigorated hopes for dialogue, but these were quickly dashed following the 2016 Pathankot and Uri attacks.
In 2019, India’s abrogation of Article 370 stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special status, following which Pakistan expelled the Indian high commissioner in Islamabad, plunging bilateral relations to their lowest point in decades.
Since then, diplomatic ties have remained fraught, with cross-border skirmishes and a near-dormant regional dialogue process. The last South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) conference, which was intended to be held in Islamabad during 2016, was also canceled as a result.
The return of an Indian foreign minister to Islamabad, especially after nearly a decade-long hiatus, hence carries symbolic weight. It signals India’s willingness to reengage, albeit within a multilateral framework where issues such as counterterrorism, regional security, and economic cooperation dominate the agenda. While the prospects for significant breakthroughs remain slim, the summit offered a window for future diplomatic overtures and provided Pakistan with an opportunity to reaffirm its role in fostering dialogue in an otherwise polarized region.
However, for Pakistan, this is more than just a diplomatic moment. It’s a opportunity to assert its strategic relevance, particularly with regard to CPEC, a crucial piece of the BRI. A day before the summit, on October 14, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chinese Premier Li Qiang inaugurated the Gwadar International Airport. The ceremony, however, was carried out remotely and not on site, highlighting the increased security concerns, especially after the October 10 attack that killed two Chinese nationals in Karachi near Jinnah International Airport.
The Pakistani government has experienced increasing pressure in the two months approaching the inauguration of the international airport in Gwadar due to protests by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), led by Dr. Mahrang Baloch. The BYC had gathered near Gwadar in August for the “Baloch Raaji Muchi” (Baloch National Gathering), highlighting the military establishment’s infringement of Baloch political and economic rights in order to facilitate CPEC activities in Balochistan.
As Pakistan aims to showcase its diplomatic ambitions regionally, the domestic political climate presents a stark contrast. Protests against human rights abuses have engulfed the country in recent weeks, with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf supporters clashing with security forces following the ousting and detention of former Prime Minister Imran Khan; student movements in Lahore, led by the Progressive Students’ Collective and Khalq Youth Front, calling for accountability over sexual abuse on college campuses and revival of student unions in the country; and Karachi seeing protests against the rise of religious extremism.
On October 13, the state cracked down on the “Sindh Rawadari March” organized in Karachi against the extrajudicial killings of Sindhis under the garb of arbitrary “blasphemy” laws in Pakistan. Additionally, earlier this month, on October 6, the Pakistani state also banned the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement, a young peaceful movement led by Manzoor Pashteen, which had been advocating for the rights of Pashtuns in Pakistan.
These social upheavals are symptomatic of a deeper malaise – rising economic inequality, human rights abuses, rampant inflation, and political instability – all concealed by the 10,000 rangers and security forces that were stationed in Islamabad since the beginning of this week in anticipation of the summit. As Islamabad aimed to project a cohesive image at the SCO, the suppression of dissent and growing authoritarianism cannot be ignored. The juxtaposition of Pakistan’s domestic political instability with its international diplomacy highlights a stark tension – one between internal fractures and the external desire for regional stability.
For India, participation in the SCO Summit was a delicate balancing act within its broader foreign policy agenda. India’s deepening ties with the United States, its position on the Ukraine conflict, and its complex relations with Russia and China – both founding members of the SCO – complicate its approach. Jaishankar’s speech at the summit signaled a pragmatic willingness to engage with a multilateral body where it finds itself alongside strategic rivals, particularly China, whose influence over the SCO is paramount. Furthermore, given India’s neutral stance in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, its presence at the SCO reflected its efforts to maintain strategic autonomy while managing its relations with Moscow, a critical defense partner. As India continues to strengthen its Quad partnership with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, its engagement in the SCO underscores the dual-track diplomacy it must pursue – balancing cooperation with both Western allies and traditional partners like Russia and its regional neighbor China.
In his speech, Jaishankar directed the summit’s attention to the need for reformed multilateralism with two major conflicts in the world currently. He highlighted the “Pact for Future” passed at this year’s U.N. General Assembly where leaders agreed to pursue reform within the U.N. Security Council; the SCO, as a powerful bloc, should be leading such a change.
During the summit Islamabad, eight significant agreements were signed by heads of states on security, trade, and economic cooperation.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif underscored the role that the SCO can play in cooperation on sustainable development, climate change, poverty alleviation, regional connectivity, and economic integration, while fostering the “Shanghai spirit.”
For South Asia and the broader region, the SCO represents a vital platform for addressing collective security concerns, fostering economic connectivity, and coordinating on pressing global challenges like counterterrorism and climate change. In the current international climate – where unilateralism and trade protectionism are resurging – the SCO’s multilateral framework offers an avenue for regional powers to assert their interests and an opportunity for a geostrategic transformation of the world order. The inclusion of India and Pakistan as members since 2017, and now Iran as of this year, highlights the organization’s potential to navigate complex geopolitical tensions while advancing regional cooperation.
Iran’s full membership in the SCO marks a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of Central and South Asia. As a major energy producer and a critical actor in West Asia, Iran’s inclusion strengthens the SCO’s role as a regional bloc capable of influencing energy security and economic integration. This move also solidifies Iran’s eastward pivot, away from the West due to prolonged sanctions and strained relations with the U.S. and EU. While India and Iran have shared economic interests – such as the development of the Chabahar port – their strategic interests may diverge within the SCO, given Iran’s close ties with China and Russia. Iran’s membership also provides Russia and China with a more unified front against Western influence, further enhancing the SCO’s strategic autonomy.
While the SCO has positioned itself as an alternative to Western-led alliances, it has not yet developed the institutional depth of economic groups like ASEAN or military blocs like NATO. Its strength lies in promoting economic partnerships and regional connectivity projects, but the lack of binding commitments and the voluntary nature of cooperation often undercuts its potential effectiveness.
Sharif, as the 2024 SCO chair, also raised similar concerns during his opening speech regarding the gap between the organization’s aspirations and its performance. Within the SCO, cooperation on regional counterterrorism issues becomes challenging, with member states not having a consensus on which groups to label as “terrorists.” For the SCO to truly fulfill its potential as a regional organization, it will need to address internal contradictions, balance the interests of its diverse members, and establish more cohesive economic and security frameworks, aside from dialogue and strategic regional cooperation. The SCO Summit may not only be a litmus test for regional multilateralism but also for re-ordering and balancing the new world order.