Whether former President Rodrigo Duterte or any senior Philippine official ever agreed to limit the resupply of the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal is seriously bedeviling Sino-Philippine relations. The Sierra Madre is a rusting ship, that was intentionally run aground at Second Thomas Shoal, one of the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This vulnerable Philippine presence on the shoal is in constant need of resupply, and China’s attempts to block resupply missions have resulted in high levels of tension.
If China succeeds in preventing repairs of the Sierra Madre, the Philippines might be forced to withdraw from Second Thomas Shoal, and China gains the opportunity to seize it. Beijing therefore is pulling out the stops to block Manila’s access, even while trying to blame the Philippines for the incidents. Chinese officials claim that the Philippines’ missions are violating some alleged agreement – variously described as “gentleman’s arrangement,” “earlier promises,” “internal understandings,” and “a new model” – on limits to the resupply missions.
Surprisingly, these allegations, while being dismissed, have produced sufficient confusion and acrimonious exchanges in Sino-Philippine relations so that the current debate misses two bigger issues. First, the publicly available records of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Embassy in Manila show that not even Chinese officials believed an alleged “gentleman’s agreement” on limiting the resupply of Second Thomas Shoal existed in 2023 and early 2024.
Second, and more importantly, China’s attempts to impose conditions on the Philippine resupply of the Sierra Madre reveal a yawning gap: Would China refrain from controlling or occupying Second Thomas Shoal if the Philippines were forced to withdraw? China has left this core question unanswered.
Alleged “Agreements” and “Understandings” Plunge Philippine Politics Into Confusion
Controversy, if not confusion, about the question of whether any of several different arrangements have ever been made preoccupy Philippine domestic politics. Terms like “verbal,” “goodwill,” and “gentleman’s” arrangements, “internal understandings,” “models,” and “earlier promises” do the rounds in the Sino-Philippine exchanges. Even President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. weighed in, saying he was “horrified” by the idea of a “secret agreement” made by his predecessor.
Duterte’s former presidential spokesperson, Harry Roque, and the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines both allege that Duterte accepted a “gentleman’s agreement” on Second Thomas Shoal. In response to such allegations, two committees of the House of Representatives launched a probe into the alleged existence of the supposed agreement reached by Duterte and China’s President Xi Jinping. Members of the former Duterte administration contradict each other or keep adding further twists.
Former Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana, for instance, said that he learned about this arrangement from the Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian in the context of a water cannon incident in November 2021, rather than from his own president. Does Lorenzana mean to imply that the arrangement was real or not real when saying that the Chinese ambassador told him about it?
Moreover, the Chinese Embassy in Manila and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also refer to additional “internal understandings” and a “new model” supposedly concluded by the former chief of the Western Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Vice Admiral Alberto Carlos in 2024. These allegations resulted in a new low in the acrimonious exchanges between the Chinese Embassy in Manila and the Philippine government. The Chinese Embassy in Manila took the extraordinary step to threaten, via the Manila Times, to publicize a wiretap of a phone call with Carlos allegedly showing the existence of “internal understandings” and a “new model” on the resupply of Second Thomas Shoal. This move was met by the Philippine National Security Advisor Eduardo Año requesting the expulsion of Chinese diplomats and a Senate inquiry into the alleged conclusion (by phone, no less) of such a “new model.”
Furthermore, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged the existence of earlier “promises to tow away” the Sierra Madre as well as a “goodwill agreement” on the access of Filipino fishermen to Scarborough Shoal. While the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs unequivocally rebutted that any understanding about Second Thomas Shoal exists, this has not been the end of the story – as aptly illustrated by a Senate inquiry and a House of Representatives probe.
Does a “Gentleman’s Agreement” on Second Thomas Shoal Exist?
The publicly available record shows that not even officials from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines believed in the existence of a Duterte-Xi “gentleman’s agreement” on limiting the resupply of the Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal in 2023.
The Chinese Embassy in Manila published two statements on the “Issue of Ren’ai Jiao” (China’s name for Second Thomas Shoal) in 2023, namely in August and October. These statements blame the Philippines (and the United States) for incidents at Second Thomas Shoal. They accuse the Philippines of violating the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, not a bilateral “gentleman’s agreement,” which is not even mentioned.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs published four statements on tensions at Second Thomas Shoal in 2023. Again, these blame the Philippines by claiming that Manila flouted the 2002 Declaration on Conduct and its promise, allegedly made several times, to tow away the Sierra Madre. None refers to a Duterte-Xi “gentleman’s agreement.” Even on March 26, 2024, the statement of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong about an incident with a Philippine resupply mission accused the Philippines of disregarding the 2002 Declaration on Conduct, not of ignoring the “gentleman’s agreement.” Several Chinese statements before April 2024 explicitly addressed incidents at Second Thomas Shoal and called out the Philippines for violating the Declaration on Conduct and older promises. None mentions the existence of a “gentleman’s agreement.”
Instead of referring to any existing arrangement, the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines called for negotiations “to manage the situation” at Second Thomas Shoal in August 2023. This suggests the Embassy believed no arrangement was in place. Moreover, China’s statement on, for instance, the most recent eighth meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) in 2024 mentioned Second Thomas Shoal but no agreement, understanding, or model. Earlier meetings of the BCM listed the topics that the BCM discussed. An agreement or understanding on Second Thomas Shoal is not among them.
In other words, Chinese officials began attaching importance to a “gentleman’s agreement” (also called a “verbal agreement”) and denouncing Philippine violations of it only after former presidential spokesperson Roque mentioned it in late March 2024. Why did China’s statements on Second Thomas Shoal not refer to a “gentleman’s agreement” throughout 2023, while also trying to blame the Philippines for incidents by claiming Manila is violating the Declaration on Conduct? The most plausible reason is that not even Chinese officials believed that an agreement was in place in 2023.
As regards the “internal understandings” and “new model” that supposedly exist all of a sudden, in addition to the “gentleman’s agreement,” Vice Admiral Carlos insisted he never consented to them.
Moreover, several of the mentioned Chinese statements refer to an “earlier promise” to tow away the Sierra Madre. However, China has never clarified who gave this promise or provided any evidence for it. Former Presidents Arroyo and Estrada denied that such a promise was ever made.
In the longstanding diplomatic efforts of the South China Sea, the Philippines has certainly learned a thing or two about broken promises. Ultimately, an agreement can only be said to exist if it is implemented on the ground. Therefore, even if Duterte had responded to Chinese proposals on the South China Sea with “let’s do it” on some occasion, this does not translate into a formal agreement. This also holds true of the alleged “goodwill arrangement” on the access of Filipino fishermen to waters around Scarborough Shoal. Filipino fishermen would certainly cherish such access – if the China Coast Guard granted it in a predictable way.
Is China then simply trying to spread disinformation and mislead the Philippine public? The fact that China tried to blame the Philippines for the high levels of tensions at Second Thomas Shoal in 2023 and 2024 by claiming that the Philippines is violating “agreements” that not even Chinese officials believe exist is perhaps the least surprising part of this story. But this begs the question of why these allegations nevertheless managed, at least to some extent, to distract from the tensions and the underlying dynamic at Second Thomas Shoal. The statement of the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs denying the existence of an arrangement could have been the end of the controversy.
It seems unlikely that any of the alleged arrangements would have become more than allegations had it not been for the contradicting and confusing comments of members of the former Duterte administration. And China’s attempt to take advantage of these comments arguably tells us as much about the former Duterte administration as about China’s approach to the South China Sea.
What Is Needed to Diffuse the Tensions at Second Thomas Shoal?
Once the underlying reason fueling the tensions at Second Thomas Shoal is stated explicitly, it is evident what is needed to diffuse tensions. The BRP Sierra Madre, the Philippines’ base on Second Thomas Shoal since the ship was deliberately run aground in 1999, is an extremely vulnerable presence. It needs constant resupplies, and the rusting hulk will soon become unlivable.
China stated that it wants to only allow the provision of food or fresh water, not repairs or constructions that would result in upgrades or a “permanent” occupation of Second Thomas Shoal. However, if China succeeds in preventing repairs of the Sierra Madre, time will make the Philippine presence on Second Thomas Shoal impossible. This will be China’s opportunity to seize control of the shoal. As time is the ally of corrosion, the blockade of Philippine resupply is a means to bring about this opportunity.
This is the underlying reason why China tries to condition and block the Philippine resupply of Second Thomas Shoal, and why the Philippines cannot accept these conditions. These conditions, in the words of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, would amount to “recognition of China’s control and administration” over Second Thomas Shoal.
Most importantly, this situation reveals what political commitment would be necessary to diffuse tensions at Second Thomas Shoal. China has never publicly committed to refrain from controlling or occupying Second Thomas Shoal if the Philippines withdrew. The starting point for any Sino-Philippine arrangement on Second Thomas Shoal must be an unequivocal commitment from China that it will not seize control of the shoal if the Philippines were forced to withdraw. In the absence of this commitment, an end to resupplying the Sierra Madre carries the real risk of China occupying the shoal.
Instead of being preoccupied with the question of whether the Philippines has already accepted any of China’s conditions in a “gentleman’s agreement”, the Philippines should come to a multipartisan consensus that a Chinese commitment to not seizing control of Second Thomas Shoal must be a core element of any arrangement addressing the dispute.